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Introduction
This article explores the differences between the activities of ethical deliberation in
the academy and in the public domain, in particular in the work of bodies appointed
to advise government.1 It draws attention to the collegiate nature of their work, the
constraints imposed by their constitution, and the need to incorporate attention to
the sociopolitical context. It argues that such ‘‘public ethics’’ is fundamentally a
contingent process, driven by pragmatic arguments rooted in particular times and
places. If this is correct, the work of advisory bodies should be assessed on a different
basis from academic papers and should be regarded more as historical documents
than works of principle. The nature of the ‘‘expertise’’ that should be brought to bear
and some related questions about the concept of evidence-based policymaking are
also considered.2
When asked, in 2008, to advise on the introduction of a system of presumed
consent or an opt-out system, the UK Organ Donation Taskforce (ODT), a multi-
disciplinary group charged with improving donation rates, concluded that such
a system should not be introduced at that time.3 The main reasons given were as
follows:
d It might undermine the idea of donation as a gift, erode trust in NHS
professionals, and even reduce donation numbers.
d It would distract attention from improvements in infrastructure for dona-
tion, retrieval, and transplantation and also from activity to promote public
understanding.
d It would be challenging and costly to implement.4
The first group of claims is essentially empirical and in principle is subject to
testing—the ODT commissioned a literature review of the available evidence.5
The second group of claims is heavily contingent on the specific policy context in
which the ODT was working. The taskforce had already completed a first report
that focused on structural changes, and these were being implemented.6 The
changes were the responsibility of individuals whose time was limited and
needed to be prioritized. This could be seen as an issue of opportunity costs; that
is, it is less about the benefits of reform than about the inability to pursue other
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policies that might be more important at that particular time. The conclusions
reached by the taskforce need to be appraised in the light of this context. It is one
of the contentions of this article that any analysis that ignores specific historical
context cannot provide an adequate critique of the work of commissions set up to
undertake public ethics. Some features of the third group of claims overlap with
this point. However, their essence is not lost opportunities but rather the social,
political, and economic costs of implementation of an opt-out policy. These chal-
lenges, although varied in nature, are all contingent on the context within which the
recommendations were addressed. It is necessary to consider how a move to pre-
sumed consent would resonate with wider political currents of the time in order to
determine whether the taskforce’s conclusions were sound. This raises some in-
teresting questions about the connection between public opinion and policymaking,
and the taskforce’s rejection of presumed consent despite apparent support from the
public can be said to be counterintuitive.7 This sociopolitical context also requires
consideration of the role of the media and politicians.
The arguments raised by the taskforce’s report had a different emphasis from
many of the more traditional ethical analyses of this area, although the latter were
considered by the Ethics Working Group.8 It is also interesting that the language of
presumed consent was replaced with that of opting out in the main report. The
terms of reference for the taskforce’s work—‘‘to examine the potential impact on
organ donation of introducing an opt-out or presumed consent system across the
UK, having regard to the views of the public and stakeholders on the clinical,
ethical, legal and societal issues’’9—wrapped these concepts up together. However,
the issues raised are rather different. The basis of an opt-out system is not that
people in fact consent (the implicit logic of the chief medical officer)9 but that it may
be legitimate to take organs irrespective of consent. This is an issue that raises
questions about the nature of our stakes in our bodies, including whether that
nature can be captured through a concept of ownership.
These latter types of arguments have been subject to much discussion by
bioethicists but were not the driving concern of the taskforce. This article reflects
on aspects of the nature of public ethics that lead to this divergence between the
concerns of academic commentators and the work of public advisory bodies.
Some Features of Doing Public Ethics
There are at least four aspects of doing public ethics that lead to constraints to
which individuals are not usually subject. The first is that public ethics is usually
done by groups of people commissioned to explore the issue and make recom-
mendations. They are not free to simply adopt a personal perspective, although
there is scope for minority reports. They are not in a position to choose the
colleagues with whom they collaborate, and they need to work with the other
members of the group. Furthermore, the scope for defining the questions they ask
is limited by the terms of their commission. The second aspect is the prevailing
policy context, which makes some solutions more feasible than others. This is
partly a matter of pragmatism—what can be achieved with the tools realistically
expected to be available (the healthcare system, scientific possibilities, likely
resource context, etc.). It is also important to recognize that public ethics is a
political enterprise that needs to take into account the art of the possible as well
as the logical force of the arguments being put forward. This extends into the
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third category, which concerns questions about discourses of legitimation. In aca-
demic writings, originality of approach is often commended, but in the more public
context, it may be a disadvantage. Public ethics is an art of persuasion as well as of
logic. Sometimes the best logical arguments may not be the most convincing for the
audiences to which they are addressed. The final category concerns the impact of
the media and public opinion on the thinking of those appointed to examine the
issues. Intriguingly, the ODT was asked in its terms of reference to have ‘‘regard to
the views of the public and stakeholders on the clinical, ethical, legal and societal
issues.’’ This is subtly different from addressing those issues independently and
also from accepting public opinion as the basis of policy.
The Collegiate Nature of the Enterprise
Although academics can work collaboratively, the norm in bioethics is for individ-
uals to present the arguments as they see them personally. This is not the case for the
members of committees set up to give advice to governments or the public. Instead,
the formulation of views that can be agreed on by the group is a collegiate process.10
This leads to a situation whereby members need to decide whether the conclusions
reached, the arguments for them, and the terms in which they are formulated are
ones that they can accept, even when they would not have reached or articulated
them in the same way. This can present particular challenges for individuals who
have previously publicly expressed a different position.
This cluster of issues can be illustrated by the recommendation of the Warnock
Committee that research on human embryos should be permitted for up to fourteen
days (subject to regulatory approval).11 No clear rationale for this recommendation
was set out in the report, but it was based on a number of factors: correspondence
with the point at which implantation in the wall of the uterus was likely to occur,
emergence of the ‘‘primitive streak’’ (which develops into the nervous system), and
individuation. These positions hint at rationales based on consistency with abortion
law (the legality of the morning-after pill is based on the fact that the Offence
Against the Person Act 1861 criminalizes procuring a miscarriage—that is, when
implantation has occurred),12 utilitarianism (no pain can be felt without a nervous
system), and arguments for genetic uniqueness providing the basis for human
personhood.13
The important point here is that the Committee adopted two crucial positions that
reflect the public nature of its task and represent characteristic constraints on work
in public ethics. First, the committee concluded that there needed to be a precise line
if the proposed laws were to be workable, hence the adoption of a specific number
of days. This is a concern common to many legal interventions, in which a ‘‘bright
line’’ is thought to be required.14 The second concerned the nature of the compro-
mises involved. Mary Warnock has suggested that, to succeed, the recommenda-
tions had to be seen
not as perfect, but as reasonable and not unduly offensive to people’s
moral feelings. We had to hope, that is to say, to achieve a broad consensus
about what could be tolerated, even by those who would have preferred
prohibition to regulation.
I learned that the language of ‘‘right’’ and ‘‘wrong’’ was inflammatory;
that it sounded arrogant, and that it provoked conflict. The very best one
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could hope for was to find something roughly ‘‘acceptable.’’ . . . Our task
had been to recommend a policy that might allow the sort of medical
and scientific progress which was in the public interest, while at the
same time not riding roughshod over the moral scruples of a significant
number of the public.15
Public ethics thus aspires more to acceptability than to philosophical neatness.
The members of committees can adopt conclusions for a variety of reasons, which
may be mutually inconsistent, provided they give a basis from which policy can
be developed.
This characteristic should be familiar to those who adopt principlist approaches
to medical ethics, based on the idea that the principles (like autonomy, beneficence,
etc.) can be adopted for different philosophical reasons but provide a common
currency for the resolution of practical problems.16 It is also familiar to lawyers who
address the mythology of Parliamentary intention; only very limited attention can
be paid to the reasons why legislation was passed, the focus being on the words
that were agreed on.
Assessing the Context
Another aspect of doing public ethics is that the appointed bodies are working in
a specific time, place, and policy context. This section focuses on the implications
of resource constraints. The ODT was initially established to examine not ethical
and social issues but rather practical measures for improving transplant services
in the context of the National Health Service, a system of socialized medicine. Its
presumed consent work was done at a time when a program of reform of the organ
retrieval system had just been put into place, and relevant clinical leaders were
already engaged in its implementation.
This has a number of significant implications. First, relevant people were a
scarce resource and could not simultaneously implement the organ retrieval reforms
and engage in a public debate. Thus, a judgment was needed on the relative priority
of system reform and legal change in increasing transplantation rates. This was
partly an issue about logistics. It was also an exercise in changing the service
culture. If the program were to be successful, staff needed to have a positive attitude
to donation. The program was intended to improve the effectiveness of donation,
retrieval, and transplantation procedures and was quite independent of the work on
changing the consent system. However, there was a connection. Presumed consent
relies for its success on clinical staff being willing to take organs on the basis of such
a presumption. If not, they might continue in practice to operate an opt-in system
because of their concern about the ethics of consent.
The conclusion of the ODT, that the case for a presumed consent or opt-out
system was not convincing, needs to be judged in this very specific historical,
organizational context. Hence the committee recommended that reform should not
occur in 2008 and that issues should be reviewed after five years if organ donation
and transplantation rates had not improved. From the perspective of those who are
interested in the moral legitimacy of presuming consent to donation, or the strength
of the imperative to assist those in need of transplant organs, this ‘‘not now, not yet’’
conclusion might seem to lack courage. However, as a pragmatic decision about
how to improve transplant rates in a specific, resource-constrained context, it is
more easily explicable.
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Sowing on Fertile Ground?
Public ethics requires a sophisticated exploration of the receptiveness of the audi-
ences that are being addressed. Writers in the academy can play a ‘‘long game,’’
challenging orthodoxies and assumptions in the confidence that once their work
makes it into the journals, it can lie dormant until people are ready to appreciate
the importance of the insights being offered. It is not necessary for the audience
to accept the arguments or frameworks being put forward; it is merely necessary
for the peer reviewers to recognize them as sufficiently novel and interesting to
publish. Public ethics can be addressed to a wide range of audiences, includ-
ing experts, advisers, service providers, governments, the media, and the general
population. However, there is normally a relatively narrow window of opportunity
to speak to these audiences, and that opportunity arises in a particular social,
political context at a specific point in time.
Understanding the discourse of public ethics therefore requires greater atten-
tion to the context than is generally seen in academic literature. This point can be
illustrated by two aspects of the report Public Health: Ethical Issues produced by
the Nuffield Council on Bioethics (NCB) in 2007:17 first, the adoption of a broadly
Millian framework of analysis in the conceptual chapters of the report and,
second, the use of the label ‘‘stewardship model’’ to characterize the approach
being proposed. In both cases, the academic literature has raised interesting
questions about the suitability of the stances taken that provide fertile lines of
inquiry. However, the debates that they engender obscure one of the dimensions
of the decision made by the working party to use that framework.
The adoption of the Millian framework was attractive because of its fit with
the prevailing public political discourse’s antagonism to the ‘‘folk devil’’ of the
‘‘Nanny State.’’ Mill’s harm principle captured the populist rejection of the idea
that the state should dictate to people how they should look after themselves.
It was also attractive because of its familiarity to the terms of public debate.18
It enabled the explanation in noncontroversial terms of the legitimacy of a
number of activities that public health ethics was thought to support, like
quarantining of infectious patients. It therefore seemed a reasonable starting
point to win over the sympathies of key audiences and to enable exploration of
the more controversial or difficult areas to which the working party sought to
draw attention.
From the perspective of academic analysis, it is interesting to explore whether
greater explanatory power can be found in other frameworks (as suggested
by John Coggon’s critique in the Journal of Medical Ethics).19 However, such a
foundation would lose the communicative power that comes from building on
and exploiting a familiar thinker known to the intended audiences. Coggon also
makes interesting points about whether or not the working party needed to
supplement the Millian framework so as to create a ‘‘revised’’ liberal framework.
He suggests that the richness of Mill’s essay On Liberty20 is such that the ad-
ditional factors could have been justified by a broader reading of the text.
However, if public ethics is an exercise in persuasion, it is important to ensure
that the audience appreciates the difference between the proposals that are being
made and their expectations of the thinker on whose work we are drawing.
It was, therefore, reasonable for the working party to proceed on the basis that,
for the main audience, On Liberty had become synonymous with Mill’s famous
Reflections on the Nature of Public Ethics
13
harm principle and that the wider nuances of his argument were unfamiliar to
them—most would not have actually read the essay but instead would have
absorbed it indirectly. Thus, it is easier to defend both the presentation of the
report as an extension of Mill’s approach rather than a rereading of the essay and
also the adoption of the harm principle as a starting point, if they are seen as exer-
cises in public communication rather than arguments addressed to colleagues in the
academic communities. The strategy makes clearer sense as public ethics than as an
exercise in philosophy.
Public Reception
A related but somewhat different point can be made about the adoption of the term
‘‘stewardship.’’ Such a label is necessary to facilitate debate in a media context that
favors dramatic images and sound bites over subtle and protracted arguments.
Thus, for public ethics some rhetorical tools are needed to improve the impact of the
work, a shorthand slogan to aid communication through the media. For academic
commentary, such simplifications come across as simplistic.21 The selection of the
stewardship tag was a decision taken at a relatively late stage in the deliberations of
the working group and looked attractive in part because it provided an association
with two influential organizations: the World Health Organization, through a minor
comment made in passing,22 and the King’s Fund, in the title of a report on gov-
ernment responsibilities in public health.23 The stewardship label therefore served to
imply that the proposals were not entirely alien and had some roots in existing
thinking by one of the communities (health policymakers) that the report sought to
influence. Although insignificant in relation to wider public acceptability, this might
assist in the report’s reception into some of the key professional groups to whom it
was addressed.
Thus, in different ways, the use of John Stuart Mill’s famous harm principle and
the epithet of stewardship are accommodations into the thinking of the working
party of the implications of exploring ethics in a public sphere rather than within the
academy. It is entirely right for academic work to draw attention to the shortcomings
of pronouncements in order to test and refine them. However, it is also appropriate
to note that the context of public communication introduces different aspects to the
challenge of doing ethics. Public ethics needs to pay more attention to the way in
which its contribution will be understood than it does to writing for academic col-
leagues, not least because the audience does not share the same technical vocabulary
or canons of interpretation that the community of scholars has developed.
Similar issues about the public reception of proposals are evident in the work of
the ODT, but with an additional interesting dimension. Here, the political context
in which the problem was being explored was important. Although the work on
presumed consent had been prompted by the annual report of the chief medical
officer, the reform had also received the personal endorsement of the prime
minister, Gordon Brown, writing in the Sunday Telegraph: ‘‘A system of this kind
seems to have the potential to close the aching gap between the potential benefits
of transplant surgery in the UK and the limits imposed by our current system of
consent.’’24 Such senior personal sponsorship cast a shadow over the taskforce’s
apparently neutral commission to enquire into the issues by suggesting the answer
that was hoped for. In so far as concern is given to the likely government response
to recommendations, there was a pretty explicit indication of what was expected.
Jonathan Montgomery
14
Even more interesting was the wider shadow cast by Gordon Brown’s support and
the way in which some sections of the media were able to present the issues as
linked with more general political debates. In his Telegraph blog, Gerald Warner
wrote: ‘‘Gordon Brown has appropriated just about everything we own, so it is no
surprise that he is now trying to nationalise our bodies. . . . Presumed consent
would be the ultimate victory of the New Labour totalitarians: the acknowledge-
ment that they own us down to the last sinew and tissue. It must be rejected.’’25
Minette Marrin offered a neat turn of phrase in the Sunday Times, under the
headline ‘‘Even in Death Our Organs Are Not for the PM to Snatch’’: ‘‘The idea lets
in an evil and dangerous political principle—the assumption that the state owns
our bodies. Brown and Labour governments before him have tried to nationalise
our private lives; now he wants to nationalise our private parts.’’26
Academic explorations of the property analogy are rooted in argument, but in the
domain of public ethics they need also take into account the personal and party
political context, which as these interventions show is pretty rough. Those charged
with developing positions on public ethics need to take political context into account.
This may mean that some arguments that are persuasive in the abstract become
dangerously vulnerable at particular times and in particular places because of
political factors that are only loosely connected with the issue in question.
Some Problems in Public Ethics
These characteristics of public ethics require an acknowledgement of the peculiar-
ities of the contexts in which the enterprise is undertaken. There are also some very
specific challenges in working on public policy in relation to bioethics that deserve
consideration and on which academics (from a wide range of disciplines) have a
considerable contribution to make in elucidating the issues and proposing solutions
to the dilemmas raised. They have, however, not yet received the attention that they
deserve. Three of these challenges will be raised here: the handling of disputes over
science, the weight to be given to public opinion, and the use of international com-
parisons. In different ways these can displace the careful ground rules of academic
argument with the raw power of politics. If public ethics is to be done well, it needs
to develop an account of how arguments should be tested and validated in light of
these types of pressures.
The Nature of Evidence
There are particular difficulties when the public clashes with the scientific com-
munity on matters of safety. How should public ethics address assertions that
measures advocated by professionals are unsafe? One solution lies in the mantra of
evidence-based policymaking. However, views of what counts as evidence may
vary between ‘‘experts’’ and the politicians, policymakers, and public to whom
recommendations are addressed. This was a significant issue for the NCB Working
Party on Public Health Ethics. It came up in two specific contexts in which public
and expert perceptions of the evidence differed—vaccine safety and fluoridation of
water supplies. Although these raise very different issues—and were hence treated
in separate case studies in the report—they overlapped in raising the problem of
contested evidence on issues of safety and efficacy and how this controversy
should be taken into account.
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In relation to the former, the working party reflected on the controversy around
the MMR vaccine, that is, when public confidence declined following the pub-
lication of a research paper in the Lancet and was not restored despite the later
statement by the journal that the paper was flawed and despite retractions by most
of its authors relating to some of the conclusions. The working party concluded that
media reporting ‘‘can influence public perceptions, potentially hindering public
health measures and affecting population health.’’27 It considered that the respon-
sible communication of scientific findings was a duty of researchers and journalists
and that it should take into account professional guidelines on science and health
communication. Implicit in this approach is a commitment to privileging expert
views on what counts as evidence over public opinion.28
There is, of course, much to be debated about evidence-based policymaking.
Evidence does not become available by accident. There may be both research com-
missioning and research publication biases, but an absence of evidence may look
like evidence of absence of an effect. Nevertheless, in the sphere of public ethics, it
seems reasonable for policymakers to take into account the mechanisms that gov-
ernment has put into place to assess scientific evidence and to accept the position
of these mechanisms on controversial issues. Thus, in relation to the safety of
vaccines, public ethics might properly rely on the advice of the Joint Committee on
Vaccination and Immunisation and of the Medicines and Healthcare Products
Regulatory Authority. This will frequently bring the findings of groups charged with
doing public ethics into conflict with some sections of the public.29
A solution may lie in separating fact questions from value judgments, that is,
seeing the former as amenable to expert decisionmaking (for which institutions
can be created) and the latter as amenable to politics. The ODT’s approach to the
public support for reform might be seen to be an example of this (see subsequent
further discussion). It suggested that public support for an opt-out system was
based on a dominant desire to improve donation rates and that therefore the
implementation of the system should be conditional on it delivering this. It took
the commitment to more transplants as a reliable piece of data but the belief that
opt-out would lead to this as a hypothesis to be independently tested.
This difficulty of disentangling fact and value questions can also be seen in the
NCB working party’s discussions of fluoridation of water supplies, another area
of significant public concern over safety.30 The report noted that the expert con-
sensus was that the ‘‘best available evidence’’ is that water fluoridation is effective
and that there is no clear association between fluoridation and bone problems or
cancers (the most significant harms identified by those opposed).31 These would
appear to be problems that concern interpretation of scientific evidence. There is an
established dose-response relationship between fluoridation and fluorosis, but here
the divergence of views is more value based. This can be seen within the scientific
studies themselves, in the use of a measure based on fluorosis ‘‘of aesthetic concern’’
to assess whether there are health problems. Aesthetics is a matter of a different
kind of judgment, on which it is less obvious that the expertise of scientists should
be privileged over that of the public.
The problems of how to take account of public views on matters of scientific
fact have recently been aired in an English judicial review case challenging NHS
(National Health Service) South Central’s decision requiring fluoridation of
water.32 Before making its decision, a health authority is obliged to consult and
ascertain public opinion and ‘‘shall not proceed . . . unless, having regard to the
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extent of support for the proposal and the cogency of the arguments advanced,
the Authority are satisfied that the health arguments in favour of proceeding with
the proposal outweigh all arguments against proceeding.’’33 The majority of the
public who responded to the consultation was opposed, as were four of the five
relevant local authorities.34 However, the authority could consider the ‘‘cogency’’
of the scientific arguments raised, and it found them unconvincing. The court
held that the Authority‘s decision to proceed despite public opposition was not
unlawful. This approach suggests that where matters of scientific evidence are
concerned, public opinion is not determinative. Indeed, as the court noted, the
draft regulations on fluoridation had suggested that fluoridation should not
happen unless local people and representative bodies were ‘‘predominantly in
support’’ of it. However, this was replaced by the final wording after discussion as
to the undesirability of holding a local referendum. This has made issues of efficacy
and safety a matter for expert evidence rather than public confidence.
This distinction between factual evidence (which is to be tested against the ‘‘truth
conditions’’ developed by experts and based on peer review) and value judgments
(to which public opinion has a more significant contribution to make) is not always
easy to make and brings its own problems. However, it may provide a workable
tool for structuring public ethics. If so, it deserves more extensive consideration
than can be offered here, but instead I want to illustrate some difficulties relating to
the value judgment side of the distinction. Public ethics is not merely a matter of
public opinion. If it were, then these value questions could be turned into questions
of evidence to be resolved by polling. Some of the challenges of this can be seen in
the work of the ODT on presumed consent.
Public Opinion and Public Policy
As has already been noted, the taskforce was asked to carry out its work ‘‘having
regard to the views of the public.’’ It sponsored a series of deliberative events in
which more than 350 members of the public were able to explore the issues with
experts.35 Initially, 65 percent were supportive or strongly supportive of the move to
an opt-out system, whereas 26 percent were opposed or strongly opposed. After their
deliberations, the proportions shifted slightly, to 72 percent and 23 percent.36
The taskforce observed that
participants assumed that introducing an opt out system would increase
organ donor numbers. . . . Indeed, some participants considered that they
would not have been assembled for such an exercise if this had not been
the case. Many participants felt that only people with strong convictions
would be likely to opt out, which would mean that the majority of people
would be registered as donors.37
It concluded that the public expression of support was based on the hypothesis
that an opt-out system would lead to more donations. From this it was inferred
that the best analysis of the position was that the public supported the legal
reform if it increased donor numbers (or perhaps more precisely, it was inferred
that the public supported it because they believed it would increase donations and
that if that belief turned out to be false, then their support would be withdrawn).
Once the taskforce concluded that the hypothesis was false, then it was also in
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a position to disregard the expressed public support as being based on a false
premise.
At first glance, this approach may appear perverse, in that it takes note of public
opinion only to reach precisely the opposite opinion from the one expressed.
However, it should not be dismissed too lightly. ‘‘Public opinion’’ is routinely used
by campaigners to support their causes, even when they have diametrically
opposed views. Thus, the members of Dignity in Dying point out that the British
Social Attitudes Survey in 2010 showed that 82 percent of the general public
‘‘believe that a doctor should probably or definitely be allowed to end the life of
a patient with a painful incurable disease at the patient’s request.’’38 From a very
different policy position, the members of Care Not Killing also rely on public
opinion to resist the legalization of euthanasia, drawing from an opinion poll in
2006 that found that 75 percent of people agreed that ‘‘people with treatable
illness such as depression might opt prematurely for suicide.’’39
The taskforce acted reasonably in seeking to understand what lay behind public
views. Much more needs to be said, however, about the weight to be put on public
opinion and precisely how it should be taken into account in policymaking.
Philosophical traditions that explore the relationship between common morality
and ethics can bring significant expertise to this exercise.40 However, this was not
the approach taken by the taskforce, which instead turned to testing the hypothesis
on which it found public opinion to be based. It did this by drawing on what could
be learned from international experience, and in taking this step it needed to
address a further familiar challenge in public ethics.
Making Comparisons Meaningful
It is quite common in public ethics, and indeed in academic literature, to use
international comparisons as a basis for policy proposals. The ODT drew on the
experience of Texas as evidence that mandated choice might lead to a reduction
in donations (when forced to choose, people preferred to say no, even when they
might have been happy to leave things open or say less without the presence of
coercion).41 This is an entirely acceptable observation provided that little is
predicated on the ‘‘might.’’ In reality, however, the might observation was used
as an argument and implied sufficient probability to constitute a reason for not
proceeding down that route. That involves a much more complex claim about the
translation of the conclusions from the Texan study to a different sociopolitical
context. It relies to an implausible degree on the independence of human nature
from social environment.
Similar points can be made about the appropriateness of drawing inferences
from associations. An association between presumed consent regimes and higher
donation rates can be seen in both international comparisons and before-and-
after studies that looked at rates prior to the introduction of presumed consent
regimes and what happened once they were in place. However, the ODT noted
that there were significant confounding variables and that presumed consent
alone was unlikely to explain the variations.42 It used this to downplay the sig-
nificance of this evidence for the formulation of policy. Nevertheless, the task-
force members did put considerable weight on the Spanish experience, which
they argued demonstrated that presumed consent worked only in tandem with
an efficient infrastructure. They noted that the introduction of the presumed
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consent legislation predated the increase in the donation rate, which followed the
system reforms, not the legal ones. This led them to their prioritization of the
implementation of their first report over a new program for law reform.
Work needs to be done on the principles that should govern the use of such
examples. Comparative analysis is seductive; one is drawn to make use of overseas
experiences where they seem to confirm one’s position and to distinguish those
areas where they do not. The systematic literature review that the taskforce com-
missioned drew on the principles of meta-analysis developed by evidence-based
medicine.43 One could conclude from this that there are so many variables that the
idea that solutions can readily be transplanted is confounded. However, despite
this, international examples are often used in public ethics as if they were reliable
guides to the consequences of reform. The ODT saw the complexity of this but
could be accused of using such evidence (despite its difficulties) when it suited the
policy being proposed and resisting it when it did not. It remains unclear how to
make the most effective use of comparative analysis in good public ethics.
Conclusion
This article has tried to show that engaging in public ethics has a different set of
ground rules than making a personal contribution to academic literature. If this is
true, then a personal exploration of the case for an opt-out system for organ donation
would be very different from the analysis offered here. My personal view is that a
conscription model for organ retrieval can be defended. I would not, however, offer
such an argument as an exercise in public ethics as described in the body of this
article. It would be too far removed from the accepted currency of that enterprise,
insufficiently plausible in the prevailing political discourse, and too open to ridicule
in key sections of the media to be likely to lead at this time to the type of society in
which I would like to live. Instead, I am content to have been part of the work of the
ODT discussed previously. Public ethics can be a significant contribution to shaping
a more attractive society, but it is not the same as working in the academy. It has its
own rules of engagement that will not be acceptable to everyone but that are
a suitable area of study in their own right.
Notes
1. The article draws on the author’s experience of sitting on the Organ Donation Taskforce, the
working party of the Nuffield Council on Bioethics (an independent UK body that produces
reports on ethical issues in biology and medicine) that produced its report entitled Public Health:
Ethical Issues, and the UK health departments’ Committee on Ethical Aspects of Pandemic
Influenza, and of chairing the Human Genetics Commission. It sets out a personal perspective on
the nature of the work of such bodies and does not represent the views of those groups, nor the
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